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OPINION OF THE COURT
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COWEN, Circuit Judge.
This case arises from a slip and fall incident in a
bathtub aboard the M/V Sovereign, a vessel operated by defendants
Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. and Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,
et al. ("Royal Caribbean").

The district court granted Royal

Caribbean's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff
Elizabeth Fedorczyk did not provide any evidence to support her
claim that Royal Caribbean's failure to provide adequate abrasive
strips in its bathtub was the proximate cause of her injuries.
Because we agree with the district court that the evidence
presented does not create a material issue of fact as to
causation, which is an essential element of the tort of
negligence, we will affirm the June 26, 1995 order of the
district court.

I.
The following facts are not disputed.

Fedorczyk sailed

from Miami aboard the Sovereign, a cruise ship operated by Royal
Caribbean.

While on board she went to the pool area, applied

sunscreen to her body, sunned herself, and swam in the pool.
After approximately two hours Fedorczyk returned to her cabin to
take a shower.

She turned on the water, stepped into the middle

of the bathtub and started to soap herself, at which time she
slipped and fell onto the floor of the tub.
The tub in her cabin was about five and one-half feet
long and two-feet, four-inches wide.
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It had four anti-skid

strips, each running from the middle to the back of the tub.
Fedorczyk has no recollection whether her feet were on or off the
abrasive strips at the time of her fall.

The tub was also

equipped with a grab rail which Fedorczyk made a failed attempt
to reach when she fell.

After the accident she returned to the

bathtub to ascertain the cause of the accident.

She re-entered

the tub and discovered that there was sufficient space between
the abrasive strips so that her feet could just fit in between
them.

However, she does not know where her feet were at the time

of the accident.
Fedorczyk's expert, an architect, testified that at the
time he examined the bathtub, there were seven as opposed to four
abrasive strips.

Even with the seven abrasive strips, according

to the expert, Royal Caribbean failed to provide a sufficiently
large area of non-slip surface to permit its safe use.

He based

his finding on the fact that the tub failed to comply with the
Consumer Products Safety Commission's standard for slip-resistent
bathing facilities.

This standard specifies that for any surface

that is textured or treated with appliques, the pattern shall be
such that a one and one-half by three inch rectangular template
placed anywhere thereon shall cover some textured or treated
area.
The expert also testified that beyond certain safety
measures, there is no definite way of preventing slips
altogether, and that falls can happen under any circumstances. He
stated that the presence of bath oils and soap are large
variables that can skew the correlation between the amount of
3

textured surface area and safety.

He concluded that Royal

Caribbean deviated from an acceptable standard of care in failing
adequately to treat or texturize the tub, and that the spacing
between the nonslip strips was the direct cause of Fedorczyk's
injuries.

II.
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
§1291.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

"When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we

exercise plenary review and apply the same test the district
court should have applied."
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).

Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d

"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(c), that test is whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."

Id. (quoting Gray v. York

Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).

"In so

deciding, the court must view the facts in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)."

Id. (quoting Gray, 957

F.2d at 1078.)
III.
A.
We first consider which substantive law applies.
Fedorczyk's negligence cause of action, for the purposes of this
matter, could have been brought under either admiralty or
diversity jurisdiction.

Substantive maritime law applies to a
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cause of action brought in admiralty.

East River S.S. Corp. v.

TransAmerica DeLeval, Inc., 476 U.S 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295,
2298 (1986).

If brought under diversity of citizenship, the

forum state's choice of law rules dictate which state law
applies.

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61

S. Ct. 1020 (1941).

Admiralty jurisdiction apparently exists

since the injury occurred on navigable waters, Foremost Ins. Co.
v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 673, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2657 (1982),
and the incident has a nexus to "traditional maritime activity."
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892 (1990); Executive
Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 253254 (1972).

A plaintiff with a claim cognizable in the district

court's admiralty jurisdiction and actionable on other
jurisdictional grounds may invoke whichever jurisdiction desired.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h).

To invoke admiralty jurisdiction, however,

a plaintiff must affirmatively insert a statement in the
pleadings identifying the claim as an "admiralty or maritime
claim."

Id.; Bodden v. Osgood, 879 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.

1989).
Fedorczyk neither pled nor otherwise invoked the
admiralty jurisdiction of the district court in the proceedings
below.

She filed her original complaint in state court, alleging

causes of action under negligence and breach of implied and
express warranties.

Royal Caribbean removed the case to federal

district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

The

complaint was not amended to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.

The

district court entered a pretrial order without objection from
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the parties stating that the jurisdictional predicate was
diversity of citizenship.

It subsequently dismissed the case on

summary judgment due to Fedorczyk's failure to prove that the
defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of her injury. The
plaintiff is the master of her complaint, and she never invoked
admiralty jurisdiction.

Indeed, the parties agreed at oral

argument they are satisfied with the application of New Jersey
state law.

It is New Jersey law that we will apply.

B.

For Fedorczyk to prevail on her negligence claim, in
addition to proving that Royal Caribbean was negligent, she must
also prove that the Royal Caribbean's negligence caused her
injury.

Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 196 A.2d 769,

772 (N.J. 1964).

Causation includes cause in fact and legal

causation, which is often referred to as proximate cause.

Courts

have often conflated cause in fact and legal causation into
"proximate cause," but the two are conceptually distinct.
PAGE KEETON

ET AL.,

PROSSER

AND

KEETON

ON THE

LAW

OF

W.

TORTS § 41, at 263

(5th ed. 1984) ("PROSSER") ("There is perhaps nothing in the
entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement . .
. [and] confusion.").
Causation in fact depends on whether an act or omission
played a material part in bringing about an event.

An act or

omission is not regarded as a cause in fact of an event if the
particular event would have occurred without it.
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PROSSER, supra,

§ 41 at 265; Kulas, 196 A.2d at 772.

When more than one act or

omission could have caused an event, then the negligent conduct
must be shown to have been a substantial factor in causing the
harm.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

JAMES, LAW

OF

OF

TORTS § 432(2) (1965).

See HARPER &

TORTS § 20.2, at 1110, 1114 n.18 (1956).

Jersey Supreme Court has adopted these principles.

The New
State of New

Jersey, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Central Power &
Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 342 (N.J. 1976); Kulas, 196 A.2d at 769.
On the issue of causation, as on any other essential
element of the tort of negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of proof.

Long v. Landy, 171 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1961); Hansen v.

Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 84 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. 1951); PROSSER,
supra, § 41, at 269.

It is axiomatic that "the mere showing of

an accident causing injuries is not sufficient from which to
infer negligence.

Negligence is a fact which must be proved; it

will not be presumed."

Hansen, 84 A.2d at 284.

The plaintiff

must introduce evidence which provides a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that it was more likely than not that the negligent
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the injury.
PROSSER, supra, § 41, at 269.
The core problem for Fedorczyk is she is unable to
prove that the negligence of Royal Caribbean in fact caused her
injury. Fedorczyk's expert testified that a person may fall in a
bathtub under ordinary circumstances and the presence of bath oil
and soap are "great variables" that could have caused the fall.
Fedorczyk could have fallen in the bathtub for reasons other than
Royal Caribbean's negligence.

Therefore, Fedorczyk must show
7

that Royal Caribbean's negligence was a substantial factor in
causing her injury.

Fedorczyk concedes that if she had been

standing on any of the four abrasive strips at the time of the
accident, she could not establish Royal Caribbean's failure to
provide adequate stripping was the cause of her injuries.
Fedorczyk has not provided any direct evidence that the
lack of abrasive surface in the bathtub caused her accident.
Instead, Fedorczyk relies solely upon what she asserts is
circumstantial proof of causation.

Circumstantial evidence when

used to reason deductively in civil cases is defined as "a
preponderance of probabilities according to the common experience
of mankind."

Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 139 A.2d

404, 411 (N.J. 1958); Hansen, 84 A.2d at 284.

The circumstances

must be strong enough "that a jury might properly, on the grounds
of probability rather than certainty, exclude the inferences
favorable to the defendant."

Jackson v. Delaware, L.& W. R.R.

Co., 170 A. 22, 24 (N.J. 1933).

See Hansen, 84 A.2d at 284 ("the

evidence must be such as to justify an inference of probability
as distinguished from . . . mere possibility") (citing Callahan
v. National Lead Co., 72 A.2d 187, 189 (N.J. 1950)); see also
Kulas, 196 A.2d at 773 ("[Causation] may rest upon legitimate
inference, so long as the proof will justify a . . . logical
inference as distinguished from mere speculation.") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Kahalili v. Rosecliff
Realty, 141 A.2d 301, 307 (N.J. 1958) ("'Reasonable probability'
is the standard of persuasion");

PROSSER, supra, § 41, at 269.

Circumstantial evidence when used to prove negligence
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must be distinguished from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur combines circumstantial evidence
with a presumption on the burden of proof.

It states that in

certain cases the circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
negligence to be presumed, and the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to rebut some element of the case.

Res ipsa loquitur

is "grounded in the sound procedural policy of placing the duty
of producing evidence on the party who has superior knowledge or
opportunity" to explain the causative circumstances. Id.

The

doctrine is applicable when: (1) the occurrence itself ordinarily
bespeaks negligence; (2) the instrumentality was within the
defendant's exclusive control; and (3) there is no indication
that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's own voluntary
act or neglect.

Buckelew v. Grossbard, 435 A.2d 1150, 1157 (N.J.

1981) (citing Bornstein, 139 A.2d at 469).

Here, Fedorczyk

concedes that res ipsa loquitur does not apply.

We agree.

The

injury resulting from falling in a bathtub does not bespeak
negligence, nor was the cause of the injury something which
necessarily lay within the Royal Caribbean's exclusive control.
Thus Fedorczyk may not rely on the mere happening of the accident
as prima facie proof of causation in fact.
Fedorczyk may still prove negligence through
circumstantial evidence, even though the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply.
(N.J. 1950).
evidence.

Menth v. Breeze Corp, 73 A.2d 183, 187

Fedorczyk presents the following circumstantial

After the accident, she discovered that her feet could

fit between the strips.

Fedorczyk also testified that she was in
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the middle of the tub at the time of the accident.

Finally, her

expert opined that based on his inspection of the tub and the
evidence in the record, Royal Caribbean's failure to adequately
strip the tub caused Fedorczyk's injuries.
Even though we must draw all legitimate inferences in
Fedorczyk's favor, the inference that she was standing between
the strips at the time of the accident, because her feet could
fit between the strips, is not an appropriate inference to be
drawn.

The possibility of the existence of an event does not

tend to prove its probability.

See Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark,

Inc., 183 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1962) (evidence that
worn wheel could cause accident insufficient to take to a jury
the issue of whether an injury was likely to have been caused by
wheel malfunction); see also Dziedzic v. St. John's Cleaners and
Shirt Launderers Inc., 249 A.2d 382 (N.J. 1969) (since no
evidence introduced on the issue of how plaintiff's positioning
in a truck increased her injury in resulting from an automobile
accident, jury could only speculate as to whether plaintiff's
contributory negligence caused her injuries).
The testimony that Fedorczyk was standing in the middle
of the tub also says nothing about whether it was more probable
than not that she was standing between the strips when she fell.
The four strips were placed parallel to the long dimension of the
tub, running one and one-half feet from the back end of the tub
to the middle.

Standing in the middle of the tub does not

provide any relevant information on whether she was standing on
or between the strips.
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Finally, the expert's conclusion that the failure to
adequately strip the tub caused Fedorczyk's accident was not
legally admissible.

An expert opinion is not admissible if the

court concludes that an opinion based upon particular facts
cannot be grounded upon those facts.

1 MCCORMICK

at 56 (John William Strong, ed. 1992).

ON

EVIDENCE, § 13,

In order for an expert

opinion to be admissible, the technique the expert employs in
formulating an opinion must be reliable.

In re Paoli R.R. Yard

PCB Lit., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, sub
nom., General Elec. Co. v. Ingram, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995).

In

contrast, if an expert opinion is based on speculation or
conjecture, it may be stricken.

1 MCCORMICK, supra, § 13, at 56

n.15.
Fedorczyk's expert testified that if there had been
more stripping, it would be more likely that she would not have
fallen.

He went on to conclude that the absence of strips caused

her to fall.

We agree that the more stripping there is in the

tub, the less likely it is a person would fall because of
inadequate stripping.

However, the expert's opinion that

inadequate stripping caused Fedorczyk's injuries is not based on
any direct or circumstantial evidence of where she was standing
when she fell.

It is speculative to conclude that the inadequate

stripping caused Fedorczyk's injuries when no evidence in the
record indicates where Fedorczyk was standing in the tub.

It is

also speculative to infer that Fedorczyk was standing between the
strips at the time of the accident solely from the fact that she
fell.

Because the expert's conclusion is based on pure
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speculation, rather than a reasonable inference, it is without
foundation and is inadmissable.
A portion of the bathtub had nonskid stripping and a
portion of it did not have the stripping.

No evidence presented

tends to prove Fedorczyk was standing either on or off the
stripping at the time she fell.

Without such evidence, the jury

is left to speculate whether Royal Cruise's negligence was the
cause in fact of her injury.

"A mere possibility of causation is

not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation
or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced,
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the
defendant."

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965).

A hypothetical illustrates the point.

A company

provides a stairway in which some of the stairs are defective and
some are in fine condition.

A person falls on the steps, but

does not know which step she fell on.

No evidence is introduced

that tends to prove she stepped on the defective step.

The

injured party simply testified that she walked down the steps and
fell.

We may not reasonably infer that the defective steps

probably caused her injury merely because she may have stepped on
a defective stair.

Without evidence establishing a likelihood

that the injured party stepped on the defective stair, a jury
would be left to speculate as to the cause of the injury.

Simply

put, increased risk of harm due to a defendant's negligence,
standing alone, does not permit an inference that an injury, more
probably than not, was caused by the negligence.
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IV.
Fedorczyk has failed to provide any direct or
circumstantial evidence of how Royal Caribbean's admitted failure
to adequately strip the bathtub caused her injury.

Without

providing any evidence tending to show where Fedorczyk was
standing when she fell, she is unable to create a material issue
of fact regarding causation.

Based on the evidence presented, a

jury could only speculate whether Fedorczyk's injuries were
caused by the inadequate stripping.

We will affirm the order of

the district court granting summary judgment for the defendant.
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FEDORCZYCK v. CARRIBEAN CRUISE LINES, LTD.,
No. 95-5462

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

Because I conclude that Fedorczyck has produced
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer
causation, I would reverse and remand for trial.

Comment b to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B
(1965) is directly on point:
The fact of causation is incapable of
mathematical proof, since no man can say with
absolute certainty what would have occurred
if the defendant had acted otherwise. If, as
a matter of ordinary experience, a particular
act or omission might be expected to produce
a particular result, and if that result has
in fact followed, the conclusion may be
justified that the causal relationship
exists. In drawing that conclusion, the
triers of fact are permitted to draw upon
ordinary human experience as to the
probabilities of the case.
Illustration 3, which provides an example of the application of
this principle, is similar to the present case:
The A Railroad Company fails to use
reasonable care to light a steep and winding
stairway leading from its waiting room to the
train platform. B, an elderly and corpulent
woman, is in the room waiting for a train.
The attendant calls out the train. B hurries
down the steps, and misses her footing in the
dusk on the unlighted stair, falls, and is
injured. On the basis of common experience
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that absence of light increases the
likelihood of such a fall, and that people do
not ordinarily fall on properly lighted
stairs, it may be found that the absence of
light was a substantial factor in causing the
fall.
Id.

More specifically, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts

§ 41 (5th ed. 1984) explains that a conclusion of causation is
permissible where "the injury which has in fact occurred is
precisely the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the
defendant would be intended to prevent."

Id. at 270.

I would resolve this appeal using these basic
principles.

Fedrorczyck's expert testified that the bathtub was

too slippery to be reasonably safe because it had insufficient
abrasive strips.
fell.

Fedorczyck was standing in the bathtub and she

Her fall is precisely the type of injury that adequate

abrasive strips were designed to prevent.

Moreover, one could

conclude based on everday experience that while falls do occur in
bathtubs that are not too slippery, they are not routine.
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could infer that Fedorczyk's fall
was caused by the unsafe condition of the tub.

While I agree

with the court that Fedorczyck cannot invoke res ipsa loquitur,
"[a] res ipsa loquitur case is . . . merely one kind of case of
circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer
. . . causation from the mere occurrence of the event and the
defendant's relation to it."

Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 328D cmt. b (emphasis added).
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